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THE ORGANISATION OF THE TRANSPORTATION 
SERVICES OF THE BRITISH ARMIEs . ON THE . 
W-ESTERN FRONT. 
By 'Li ut.-Colonel A. C, FEWTRELL, D.S.O., A.E. 
- Thc subject is one of such huge dimensions that it is 
only possible ,to briefly deal with it in a general sury.ey. 
I (the author) had the unique privilege of being att~ched 
by Genera l Sir William Birdwood to th (;) Transportation 
Directol'ate in 1917 as the Australian Representative, the 
idea being to study the organisation and to compile 'notes, 
30 that the expert knowledge gained would be available 
for the Australian Defence Authorities, Owing to my 
collapse, and subsequent illness as the result of the over-
sh~n by the previous fighting in 1916-17, this impqrtant 
work ,ras never completed. 
Beforc proceeding with the subject propel'; it is pro-
posed to outline a brief description of the size of the 
British Armies, which necessitated the. r e-organisation of 
t hese Services, in ' order that you may be able to gras!} 
the magnitude of snch an l~ndertakjng . , 
The British Army at the commencement of the war 
consist ed only of six . Divisions available to help France. 
These Pivisioils ' were divided into two Army Corps, one 
of which the late Commander-in-Chief of our Armies, Sir 
Douglas Haig, originally commanded as Corps , Com-
mander. 
The normal stl' ngth of a British Division in round 
uurobel i 19,000 all ranks, so that the original Expe-
itiona1'Y Foree, comprising the t wo .Army Corps and 
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lines of communication troops, numbere.d approximately 
120,00.0 all ranks. t! 
The composition of the British Expeditionary For~'e in 
the :fi eJd on the vVestern Front when the great offensive wa 
>' • ~ 
launched on July 1st, 1916, consisted of :fiv:~ Armies t6-
gether with two Cavl;l:1ry .Cqrps and IJines of Communica-
tion Troops. 
It has frequently ha.pp~ned tha t ·an A.rmy Comnumder 
has had five Army Corps embodied in his command, 0 
that it will be ea.~ily u~derstood tha.t the original trans-
. . . 
portation arrangements for the first six Divisions would 
T'equire reorganisation o,ring to the increasing numbers 
. . 
which poured ov:er to France to swell up our st rength to 
the five Armies, etc., ah~eady mentioned (above) . A glance · 
J • , • • . 
at the chart hereunder will ·quicklY give you an idea of 
the size of an Arm.y ~ ,the fieid, the nor'mal strength of 
which comprises foul' Army Corps , t he normal strength 
, , 
of each Corps being fOliI' Divisions. 
'rhe normal strength of one of the Armies approximat!l 
330,000 all ranks, or almost three times the size of the 
original B.E.F. landed in France. Taking the five Armies, 
Cavalry and Lines of CommunicationTroops, the strength 
was swelled to approximately seventeen times that of the 
strength of ·the "Old Contemptibles." 
'1'0 the professionally trained mind. ot the engineer, the 
.difficulties which would of necessity ar ise in connectiolt 
with the subject under treatment .rou t be apparent. 
Circumstances Which Brought About the Reorganisation. 
Prior to the late war armies operating In civilised 
countries had used the existing railways and r oads in 
those countries. , Mobilit~ was just as important in those 
days as it was during the recent struggle, but the theory 
held was that it would not be possible to' increase mo-
bility by the COI;lstructon of additional railways, 'etc., 
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. cimini the operations. Consequently the existing facili-
t ies for ' transportation controlled the ]l1ovements of 
armies in the past. 
'1'he pre-war agreement between France and Britain, in 
the event of a British Expeditional~Y Force being re-
quired, was that F rance would arrange the landing of the 
troops, and that arrangements would be made for the 
French r ailways to carry out ali" transportation n ecessary 
for the maintenance of that force in the field. When 
France was fa'ced by an invasion of the enemy she ·was 
compelled to mobilise a large pel'centage of the railway 
, peirsonnel for service with the colors' to augment her 
.fighting str ength, 'which had been seriously depleted in 
the great losses she ha:d suffered in the early stages of the 
tl'uggle. At first it was t)lOught that th'e war would not 
last longer than six months, and the risks of maintaining 
the 'l'ailways with the reduced personnel were confidently 
faced; bu1t when the war fiad contill'lled for a year the 
results .of the sh.ortage of persQnnel began _tQ se l'iQusly 
embarrass QperatiQns. The .operating staff was .over-
worked, and the maintenance staff cO~lld nQt kel'p pace 
with the repairs .of the rolling stock, etc. It was at this 
p.eriQd that th'e new Army CQrps .of the Kitchener Armies 
were arriving .on the W estel;n FrQnt, and they threw an 
additional strain on to the r ailways. It was' SQon appa-
rent that the '.original agreement with the French tQ main-
tain .our Ar my, nQW fast becQming plural in numb er, CQuid 
-nQ lon ger be carried out without material assistance by 
the British Military Anthdrities. 
The British natiQn 's energies were nQW being thQr-
·oughly .or ganised tQ provide men and ammunition fQi' t he 
, Vestem FrQnt. · LQr d Kitchener's effQrts were well re-
warded TIl the fQrmer ense, and ' Mr. LlQyd G(>Qr ge had 
grasped the prQblem .of prQviding munitiQns with a fi rm 
hand. The ' W estern Front had settled down ' tQ "trench 
• 
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, . 
waria1'e. " '1'he calibre of the guns and their numbers had 
O'radnally increased, app~oximating siege conditions, and 
sUIce mobility had become of less importanC(l the ammu-
nition provided for the guns was greatly increased. The 
output of animuuition and stores had now reached such 
proportions that the transportation .question 'yas becom-
Ulg vitally ilnportant, and it. became so serious that -at -~~e 
period in 1916 it was doubtful whether ' the ammunition 
couJd ever be carried up to the guns. 
Factories had been constructed all ovel' Great Britain., 
and by the middle o~. 1916 it was apparent that the out-
put of ammunition need only be l~mited by the 'amount 
of steel which could be made available, and it was ' cal-· 
I:mlated that it would' be possible to :provid'e 10,O~O tons of 
ammbnitio:p. a day'. 
The French docks and r ailways controlle'd the .sItuation, 
and from the il~ormation. In'o~id'e<;l by the ' British 
Authorities in France it was !fleaI" that unless some re-
ol~aI).i~~tion was - urgently carded ?~tl ~ the col1strl.).ction 
of further factories, and even the output of the already 
constructed ' fact~ri~s in Hreat Britain, was useless, a~ it 
,~0~11d 'not be po.ssible to l~n~ i~ in Fr&nce.' . :' . 
'1'he British Cabinet acted · promptly and .sent · a Com-
mission overseas to enquire into the transportation ques-
tion thoroughly, par ticularly to examine the methods· ot 
working the base' portsi as there was .. s.ome doubt as to 
whether they were being used t o the best advantage. 
H ere again the French mobilisation had .reduced the 
civilian labor available. lor working the :docks .. , 
'1'he British organisation availa:ble f.or handling troops, 
suppli tls , etc.; at the docks ·was of-a purely military -:-nature. 
A an exainple, troopships w.ere beulg unloaded by ~ p.er-
sonnel dra:wll from the t r oops on board, the .majority of 
whom had ' never seen cargo handled in ship's 'slings be-
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fore . You will readily per:ceive 'how ' shipping was ham-
pered under such conditions. 
Personnel of Oommission. 
This Commission of investigation was headed by Sir 
Eric Geddes, who had alreadY proved his capl:lcity fo r 
organisation in the Department of the J\finistry for Mlmi-
tions. In civi lian life Sir Eric was general man&ger of 
one of the large ~nglish railway companies. H e had 
associated wit.h him several military and civilian members 
of the Indian Railway Service. 
'rIle Commission a~Tived, on theW est.ern Front after 
the Somme battles had been in progress for some 1;ime. 
. . 
Great preparation . had been ·made for this '. ' push. " A 
heavy concentration of troops ,and' guns was made on a 
, nano'" f ront.. ,The ammunition required for the guns 
was greatly in excess of all calculations ever made before-
the war. It was probably not sufficiently r ealised what a 
heavy strain this concentration would · throw on to the 
l'ailways and roads lea.ding . to the area of conc·entration. 
As th e offensive continued the strain r eached ·breaking 
point. What could not be carried on the railways was 
thrust on to thc roads. The ' winter was. rapidly ap-
proaching, an d the roads soon began to break up, and it. 
was n ecessary to obtain l~rge quantities of road mat.erial 
and to employ an army of men to save them from col-
lapsing. The Commission had the opport.unit.y of seeing 
these condit.ions, and t.heir recommendat.ions included t.he 
sug'gestion t.hat. light. . J'ailways should be construct ed 
qui cld y t.o relieve the r oads. Very lit.tle provision had' 
been made for t.his class of railway. In isolat.ed cases 
Chief E ngineers of Army Corps had experimen ted with 
it, but. had n~ver taken it up seriously. 
During the tour of investigation t.he auther was 
h onored 1 by a visit. from the Commission, who were 
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anxious to ee the methods adopted by tIle author 
in the construction' of light railway to the Ypres salient, 
and to diecnss the. met;hods of operation in order to elimi-
nate road t.ransport. ' The' me~bers w!3re very, interested 
in the work of the Australians, pa,rticularly so as it was 
the first light railway in operation ,on the British front . 
Later we had the opportunity of cons~ructing a complete 
system for our. Australian . Army Co:rps, and ,practically 
demonstrated to the British- Armie the usefulness and 
mobility of light r~ilways, ', both in trench warfare and 
during ai1 advance. 
'{'he Commission found a lack of co-ordination in the 
Transportation Services throughout the whole · of the 
British zone. TIi:e conditons are emlnciated hereunder : 
1) All rail~vay tra,nspor t ~va.s dependent on what was 
made availa ble by t~e French Author ities, and frequently 
the British Army demands cla:shed with French civilian 
requirements. 
(2) The working of the docks was in the hands of Base 
Commandants, end'eavouring to work in with other Army 
Directora'tes han dling supplies, etc. . 
(3) The forward communications, such as light rail-
way (mostly trench tl:amways) and roads, were in the 
hands of Chief Engineers of the Armies . 
(4 ) The control of the t raffic on the c~n~s was In the 
hands of the Navy. 
Their summary of the diffi culties and omissions, viz.:-
(a) Congestion .of the docks, 
(b) Exhaustion of the broad gauge ram,vay, 
(c) Absence of light r ailway material, 
. (d ) Breakin g up' of, the r oads, . 
decided the Comma~der-in-Chief to instItute a r eorganisa-
tion of the whole of these ervices, and that it should be 
ptlt in to' the ha~ds of capable men who were trained fo 
handle t raffic on a great scale in p.eace time. He decided 
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to appoint a Director-General of Transpor tation, who 
·would be r esponsible for the co-ordin~tion of all the 
means of transport which could be placed at ' the disposal 
of the Armies. and for t he provision of all mat erial and 
plant required to perfect these means of transportation. 
Selection of Director-General of Transportation. 
'It was only natural that the Commander-in-Chief 
hould select Sir E ric Geddes for the appointment, with 
the rank of Major-General, as he already 1?ossessed a very 
complete knowledge of the prevailing conditions, the re-
sult of his experience as leader of the Commission. 
The C. in C. gave him a free hand to select his staff, and 
these appointments embraced some of the leading engi-
neering and railway traffic experts in Britain, Canada and 
India. I was selected for appointment as Assistant Di-
rector of Light Railways, but the r equest was r efused by 
General Birdwood for my transfer from the A.I.F . P re- . 
viously the Ai'my Railway b irectorate was embodied in 
the Quarter-Master-General's Department. 
The charts her eund.er show the r elative po~itions of im-
portance the old Directorate' held to that of the new 
Du'ectorate of Transportation. 
It will be n oticed that the Directorate of Railways was 
ubservient to one of the Deputy -Quar ter-Master-Generals, 
a professional soldier, with lit tle knowledge of railway 
requirements, and the Direct or had two senior officers as 
a bar rier between himself and the C. in C. 
The D.G.T. under the reorganisation was given direct 
access to the C. in C. in the face of strong opposition on 
the part of the Q.M.G., thus short-circuiting the cumber~ 
some machinery of his Department. 
16J TRANSPORTATION SERVICBS OF THE B RITISJI ARMIBS. 
Calculations Prior to an Operation Affecting 
. Tmnsporta tion. 
"\i\ hen the C. in C. decided to carr y out an oper ation the 
f ollowing calC'ulations were made :-
(1) 'rhe ,number of troops required ' on the f r ont- . of 
operations. 
(2) The number of guns, amount '.of ammunition, and 
tonnage of food supplies and engineer stores. 
The former calculation was made by t he General Staff, 
und the latter by the Quarter-Master-General's Depart-
ment. The total r eq'uirements of the C. in C. were then 
communicated to the D:G.T., who pr()"ceed~d to make the 
necessary calculations to _decide whether the existing 
communications could cope with the requirements, or 
whether additional railways, light railways, or r oads were 
required. If the latter, then surveys were made, r ailways 
re-constructed or duplicated, and roads constructed or 
improved, as may be necessary. If the' D.G.T. considered 
that the construction of additJonal communications would 
not suffice for the t onnage r equired, he would then inform 
the other branches of the C. in C's. staff, and he would 
obtain from General Headquarters an or der for priority 
for tne vari6us requirements of the Armies. Under 
these arrangements car eful calculation and preparation 
were made to ensure that not only any particular opera-
t ion could be undertak en with the necessary number of 
t roops, but that the operation cOlud be maintained f or 
the period of t ime which the C. in C. coru;idered necessary 
to br ing it to a successful conclusion . 
D.G.T. Organisation. 
The following chart indicates the grouping of the 
various Departments, etc., in the n ew scheme, as existing 
.on J anuary 1st, 1918. The original or ganisation as laid 
.(lown by Sir Er ic Geddes differed slightly from that 
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"Shown in char t, the modification being made by Gener al 
P. 4 . M. Nash. C.B., the then D.G.T., and successor to Sir 
Eric Geddes. 
Th'e or ganisation embodied sevent een distinct Depart-
m'ents, etc., . each self-contained and indepe:r:tdent of one 
anothel,. The headquarters of each Depar tment, etc .. 
were grouped together in the rear area, near Sir Douglas 
H alg '8 General Headquarters, and the combined grouping 
was designated G.H.Q. (General Headquarters) . The 
D.G.T. established' an advanced G.H.Q. in the front zone 
of operations as an intelligence bureau for transportation, 
, 
a nd also as a convenient base for the D.D.G.Ts. (1) and 
(2) to work fropl and s.upervise the front army areas, 
their main headquarters being at G.H.Q. 
The British zone was divided for supervision into three 
areas, viz. :-
(1) Base P Ol'ts to Railhead Areas (Army Areas) , super-
vised by the D.D.G.T. (T. ) . 
(2) Northern F orward Ar ea from the boundary of the 
Railhead Area to a line in the immediate rear of the 
Front Line, known as t he D.G.'f. Line, supervised by the 
D.D.G.T. (2). 
(3) Southern Forward Area, etc., supervised by the 
D.D.G.T. (1) . . -
The following chart illustrates the apportionment to 
the. varjou~. Deputies. The Armies are shown in their 
relative positirms in the latter part of 1917. f rom the Bel-
gian coast to our junction with the French Armies. 
D.D.G.T. (T) (Technical) was responsible £01' k eeping 
close touch with the Quarter Master General's Depart-
ment, and the allotment of tonnage As the chart (above ) 
indicates, he was responsible for the traffic working in 
t he r ear area, and in addition he acted as the Technical 
Adviser to the D.-G.T., and supervised the requisit ions for 
" plant" and material ordered by the Executive Directors. 
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D.D.G.T. 1 and 2.-The 1st, 2nd, and 3rd At'm r Areas 
WO:lre all6tted to 1Jle D.D.M, (1) for supervision, and the 
4th and 5th Army Areas t o the D.D.G.T. (2), and these 
two deputies were responsible £0+ seeing that the requir e-' 
ment· of the Armi~s wer'e met in the Forward Area, that 
all schemes of construction to meet contemplated opera-
tions, were prepared and subsequently; th:;tt the work was 
carried out in the given time. 
'The deplAties (1) and (2) were represented at each 
Army Headquarters by a Staff Officer called the A.D.G.T. 
(Assistant Director-General for Transportation) . 
D.D.G.T. (O).-This deputy was responsible for the 
militat'y side of the organisation. The gl'eater majority 
of the technical offi{lers were not ' professional soldiers, and 
the D.G.T . .coll$idered it nece sary to have a st aff of re-
gular officers in order to O'ive the necessary assistance in 
military matters, thus freeing the technical officers from 
all military details. He was als.o char ged wi~h the military 
detail of the organisation -of the new units required Lor 
transportation. 
D.D.G.T. (O).-This deputy was appointed as the 
D.G.T. 's consultant in all matters affecting engineering 
cOJ;l.struction, and in methods ' of employment of labour. 
This officer also commanded 10,000 Canadian Railway 
Oonstruction troops, divided up into. t en battalions, which 
were used on broad and light railway -construction. 
Technical Organisation in Army Areas. -
The pri~cipal Transportation Officer in ' each Army 
Area was the A.D.G.T., .he was the Transportation Staff 
Offi<;er to the Army Commander . l t was his duty to co-
ordinate the work of the several branches of direct orates, 
etc., allotted to the Ar my Area, for the Army Command-
er'fl information, and to act as the latter 's channel of 
communication for the t ransmission of all orders to the 
